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Introduction  
Failures in the performance of simple tasks involving 
multiple objects, such as lighting a candle or juicing an 
orange, have frequently been reported following neural 
injury. These failures often involve the repetition or 
omission of key steps in the tasks, together with misuse 
of and/or failure to use necessary or appropriate tools. 
Thus, when lighting a candle a patient who is prone to 
such errors might fail to strike the match before 
bringing it towards the wick of the candle, or even 
attempt to strike the match against the candle instead of 
against the side of the matchbox. Such errors have been 
attributed to a variety of causes, both at the anatomical 
level and the cognitive level. Thus, Luria (1966), who 
observed action errors in patients with bilateral frontal 
lesions, suggested that the errors arose from “the gross 
disintegration of the ‘preliminary synthesis’ of 
intended actions and […] disturbances of the process of 
comparison of intention and effect” (Luria, 1966, p. 
238). He referred to the deficit as frontal apraxia. De 
Renzi & Lucchelli (1988), on the other hand, observed 
similar errors in patients with predominately left 
temporoparietal lesions, and suggested that they arose 
from a deficit in the retrieval of object-related 
knowledge, and in particular from “a lack of access to 
a specific aspect of the semantic store” (De Renzi & 
Lucchelli, 1988, p. 1183). De Renzi & Lucchelli’s 
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work was framed within the context of ideational 
apraxia originating with Pick (1905) and Liepmann 
(1920). More recently, Schwartz and colleagues 
(Schwartz et al., 1991; Schwartz et al., 1995; Schwartz 
et al., 1998) and Humphreys & Forde (1998) have 
performed detailed studies of errors in the semi-
naturalistic action of frontal patients, while Rumiati et 
al. (2001) have documented action errors in two 
patients with left hemisphere damage (one with a 
cortical-subcortical lesion affecting the superior 
parietal lobule and the other with a large fronto-
temporo-parietal ischemic lesion). 
Schwartz and colleagues have also performed 
detailed analyses of the types of action errors produced 
by patients, and have demonstrated similar proportions 
of each type of error in different patient groups (closed 
head injury patients: Schwartz et al., 1998; left stroke 
patients: Buxbaum et al., 1998; right stroke patients: 
Schwartz et al., 1999; and dementia patients: 
Giovannetti et al., 2002). On the basis of this, Schwartz 
et al. (1998) argued that action disorganisation 
following neural injury arises from a general inability 
to sustain the cognitive resources necessary for the 
performance of naturalistic activities. An alternative 
account, however, for the similarities in error profiles 
may be developed by assuming that behaviour is the 
product of multiple interacting systems, where the 
interactions are such that damage to different systems 
may, at least on the kinds of naturalistic tasks explored 
by Schwartz and colleagues, result in similar 
behavioural disorders. Hartmann et al. (2005) have 
provided evidence for such an account by 
demonstrating that while two groups of patients with 
left and right brain damage did not differ on the 
performance of two naturalistic tasks (preparing filter 
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coffee and assembling a tape recorder), they did differ 
on a number of other measures (e.g., keeping track of 
multi-step actions and retrieval of functional 
knowledge) which, Hartmann et al. argue, support 
those tasks.1 
Cooper et al. (2005) have developed an account 
of this alternative type based on the Norman & Shallice 
(1980, 1986) dual-systems theory of the control of 
routine and willed behaviour. According to this theory, 
one system  – contention scheduling – is responsible 
for the control of routine action, while another – 
supervisory attention – is able to bias this system when 
willed control over behaviour is required. Contention 
scheduling is itself a complex process, requiring the 
integration of hierarchically structured task knowledge 
(action schemas relating to, for example, the sequence 
of actions involved in preparing a cup of tea) and 
situation-specific factors (such as whether sugar is 
available in cube form or in granulated form). In 
addition, even simple tasks require the maintenance 
and monitoring of goals (such as whether sugar has 
been added when preparing tea) – concepts that belong 
more to the realm of supervisory attention than 
contention scheduling. Working with a computational 
elaboration of the contention scheduling theory, 
Cooper & Shallice (2000) have demonstrated how a 
system of this form can yield the kinds of action errors 
seen in patients. More recently Cooper et al. (2005) 
have augmented the system with supervisory functions 
relating to monitoring. By applying the resultant 
system to the semi-complex task of preparing and 
packing a child’s lunchbox, Cooper et al. (2005) 
demonstrated that damage to different aspects of the 
system (i.e., to either the processes involved in schema 
activation or the processes involved in the activation of 
object representations) can lead to similar error 
patterns, as seen in the different patient groups studied 
by Schwartz and colleagues (i.e., Schwartz et al., 1998; 
Buxbaum et al., 1998; Schwartz et al., 1999; 
Giovannetti et al., 2002). 
The results of the Cooper et al. simulation 
studies are encouraging because they provide an 
explanation not only for the similarities between the 
error profiles of patient groups but also for the 
sensitivity of such error profiles to effects of the 
context in which a task is performed, such as the 
number of distractor objects present in the immediate 
environment. However, the work to date has focussed 
on data from group studies of semi-complex 
naturalistic tasks (preparing and packing a child’s 
                                                          
 
1 Unlike Schwartz and colleagues, Hartmann et al. (2005) did 
not perform analyses of the errors of their patient groups. 
Rather, they scored performance on naturalistic tasks in terms 
of accomplishment of steps within each task and examined 
associations and dissociations between these measures and 
performance on other tasks. An error analysis was not 
attempted primarily because of difficulties in inter-rater 
reliability when scoring errors (Goldberg, p.c., 2005). 
 
lunchbox). It is important also to demonstrate that the 
model can account for the error patterns of individual 
patients. The previous work also did not attempt to 
account for certain classes of error relating specifically 
to tool use (e.g., tool omission errors, where a patient 
might ignore a tool such as a knife and instead spread 
butter on toast using his/her finger, or pantomime 
errors, were a patient might pantomime the use of a 
tool instead of actually using the tool), or for certain 
subtypes of errors (such as errors relating to the 
location of an action, which Rumiati et al. (2001) 
divide into two categories). This paper reports 
simulation work that addresses these shortcomings. We 
begin with a summary and discussion of the error data 
of two ideational apraxic patients originally reported 
by Rumiati et al. (2001). This is followed by an 
overview of the computational model and a report on 
the results of a series of simulation studies that 
demonstrate a good fit between the behaviour of the 
model when appropriately lesioned and the ideational 
apraxic patients. The discussion then focuses on a 
range of issues including the relationship between 
specific parameters and particular error profiles. 
Sequential and Conceptual Errors in 
Purposeful Action 
Central to the quantitative study of deficits in the 
organisation of action is the classification of errors, and 
numerous error classification systems have been 
developed. Many authors have adopted a core set of 
error types that differentiates between general 
clumsiness, sequence errors of various types (including 
omission of key actions, anticipatory selection of 
actions, addition of irrelevant or unnecessary actions, 
and inappropriate repetition of actions), tool omission 
or misuse errors, object substitution errors (e.g., 
pouring coffee grounds instead of sugar onto cereal), 
mislocation errors (performing an action in the wrong 
location) and mis-estimation errors (using grossly too 
much or too little of some substance), as well as 
numerous other, less common, types of error. (See, for 
example, De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988; Schwartz et al., 
1991; Schwartz et al., 1998; Humphreys & Forde, 
1998, Rumiati et al., 2001) 
Of the various error classifications available, 
that developed by Rumiati et al. (2001) is particularly 
comprehensive because it breaks two of the more 
standard error types – object misuse and action 
mislocation – into two subtypes. At the highest level 
the classification (duplicated in part in Table 1) 
distinguishes between sequential errors, where the 
correct actions are attempted out of sequence, and 
conceptual errors, where invalid or inappropriate 
actions are attempted. Of the various conceptual errors, 
the classification distinguishes between misuse errors 
in which the action is appropriate to a different tool 
(e.g., hammering with a saw) and misuse errors in 
which the action is appropriate to a closely related tool 
or the same tool in a different context (e.g., using a 
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knife to cut an orange with a pressing motion instead of 
a sawing motion), and of the various mislocation errors 
the classification distinguishes between mislocation 
errors in which the correct action is performed in 
completely the wrong place (pouring liquid onto the 
table instead of into a container) and those in which the 
correct action is performed at the wrong location of the 
tool or target object (e.g., striking the match on the 
wrong part of the matchbox). 
Note that while errors of tool use do not form a 
distinct class within the classification, many of the 
error types within the classification do specifically 
relate to tool use. For example, tool omission errors 
involve failure to use a tool when one is necessary by 
convention and when an appropriate tool is available. 
Other errors involve tool misuse (e.g., hammering with 
a saw: Rumiati et al., 2001) and mislocation of a tool-
appropriate action (e.g., bringing a lit match to the 
wrong end of a candle when attempting to light the 
candle: De Renzi & Lucchelli, 1988). A critical feature 
of all of these errors is that they arise in the course of 
using one or more objects within goal-directed or 
purposeful action, and involve the failed use of an 
object or objects in an attempt to achieve one’s goals.  
A key feature of the Rumiati et al. classification 
is that neurological patients may show a tendency 
towards one type of misuse error over the other, or 
towards one type of mislocation error over the other. 
Thus Rumiati et al. (2001) reported the error profiles of 
two ideational apraxic patients who each completed 
four attempts at ten simple multiple objects tasks 
similar to those used by De Renzi & Lucchelli (1988) 
in assessing ideational apraxia. The tasks included 
lighting a candle, preparing orange juice, pouring a 
drink from an initially sealed bottle, etc. The error data 
are summarised in Table 2. As can be seen from the 
table, patient DR made an average of 12.50 errors over 
the 10 tasks, and his most common error type was 
misuse2. Most of his other errors were sequence errors, 
though he also made several mislocation2 errors and 
some tool omission errors. It is of particular note that 
DR never produced misuse1 type errors (so his misuse 
errors were always appropriate for the type of tool 
being used, but inappropriate for the precise situation 
in which the tool was being used). Similarly DR never 
produced mislocation2 type errors. So although he 
sometimes selected the wrong target location for 
actions such as pouring, when the correct target or 
implement was selected he always performed the 
action in the correct location on that target or 
implement. This pattern provides some support for 
Rumiati et al.’s subdivision of the two types of error. 
DR’s behaviour contrasts with that of FG, who 
was in general more error prone. While FG produced 
errors of all types (including tool omissions at similar 
rates to DR), he tended to produce more mislocation2 
errors than mislocation1 errors, and his misuse errors 
were relatively rare in comparison with DR. The 
difference in error patterns is striking but does not 
necessarily implicate different functional deficits in the 
two patients; the tendency toward misuse2 errors in the 
less severe disorder may simply be overridden by a 
tendency towards mislocation2 errors in the more 
severe disorder.  
A Computational Account of Normal 
and Impaired Action Selection 
Rumiati et al. (2001) provided a verbal account of their 
patients’ errors within the framework of the 
computational model of action selection developed by 
Cooper & Shallice (2000), but that model was intended 
only to provide a qualitative account of patient errors. 
Table 1:  Definitions and examples of the principal error types adopted by Rumiati et al. (2001). 
Error Description  
Sequence errors Addition, omission, perseveration or anticipation of a step in the action sequence 
Misuse1 An action that is appropriate to an object different from the target object (e.g., 
hammering with a saw) 
Misuse2 An action that is appropriate at a superordinate level to the object at hand but is 
inappropriately specified at the subordinate level (e.g., cutting an orange with a knife as 
it if were butter) 
Mislocation1 An action that is appropriate to the object in hand but is performed in completely the 
wrong place (e.g., pouring some liquid from the bottle onto the table rather than into 
the glass) 
Mislocation2 An action involving the correct general selection of the target object on which to 
operate with the source object or instrument in hand but with the exact location of the 
action being wrong (e.g., striking the match inside the matchbox) 
Tool omission Using the hand instead of an obligatory tool (e.g., opening a bottle without using the 
bottle opener) 
Pantomime Pantomiming the use of the tool/object instead of actually using it 
Perplexity A delay or hesitation in performing an action 
Toying Repeated touching or moving of an object without actually using it 
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Thus, the model did not lead to a quantitative account 
of the error profiles of individual patients. Rumiati et 
al. (2001) were therefore unable to relate the error 
patterns of their patients to a specific functional deficit 
within the model. In order to address both of these 
issues, the extended Cooper & Shallice model (as 
described by Cooper et al., 2005) has been applied to a 
subset of the multiple object tasks used by Rumiati et 
al. (2001) with a view to providing a quantitative 
account of the error profiles of Rumiati et al.’s 
patients. This section provides basic details of the 
model and its application to the multiple object tasks. 
(Full details of the model are available in Cooper & 
Shallice (2000) and Cooper et al. (2005)). The results 
of the multiple object task simulation studies are 
reported in the following section. 
Principal Assumptions of the Model 
The Schema Network 
It is assumed that knowledge of routine action 
sequences such as those involved in simple multiple 
object tasks is embodied in schemas. Thus, we may 
have a schema for lighting a match or for opening a 
wine bottle. Schemas are held to be purposeful or goal 
directed (in that they may be invoked in order to 
achieve a specified goal) and consist of a set of 
components that are themselves subgoals and that are 
ordered through pre-conditions and post-conditions. 
Thus, the schema for lighting a match might consist of 
three subgoals: holding a match, holding a matchbox 
and holding a lit match, where the pre-conditions of the 
first two subgoals are that a hand be available to hold 
the object and the pre-condition of the third is that an 
unused match be held in one hand and a closed 
matchbox held in the other. Other schemas will exist 
that achieve the subgoals (e.g., for fixating upon a 
match and then grasping it appropriately, or for 
fixating upon the side of a matchbox and then striking 
the head of a held match against it). Schemas thus form 
a hierarchy, with high level schemas corresponding to 
more complex action sequences and low level schemas 
corresponding to simple actions such as fixating on an 
object or picking up the fixated object.2 
It is further assumed that schemas have 
activation levels and that behaviour is controlled by 
those schemas that have the highest levels of 
activation. Schemas that are sufficiently active (i.e., 
whose activation is greater than threshold) excite those 
schemas that achieve their subgoals (subject to 
satisfaction of pre-conditions and post-conditions), 
while schemas that correspond to alternative ways of 
achieving a common goal or share effector 
requirements compete for activation through mutual 
inhibition. 
Schemas may also be triggered or activated 
either in a top-down fashion by intentions generated 
and maintained by some super-ordinate cognitive 
system (Norman & Shallice’s supervisory attentional 
system) or in a bottom-up fashion by features or 
objects in the environment. The former reflects top-
down or willed control of behaviour, while the latter is 
consistent with neurological disorders in which objects 
seem to capture behaviour (e.g., utilisation behaviour 
(Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice et al, 1989; Boccardi et al., 
2002) and anarchic hand syndrome (Goldberg et al., 
1981; Della Sala et al., 1991)). The latter also requires 
that for each schema there be a function that specifies 
the extent to which any given state of the environment 
triggers the schema. 
                                                          
 
2 Following Botvinick & Plaut (2004), we assume that 
fixating upon an object is itself an action. The lowest level of 
the schema hierarchy therefore includes schemas for fixating 
on objects (e.g., fixate-source) and operating on the currently 
fixated object (e.g., pick-up, which picks up the currently 
fixated object). This treatment of fixation is discussed further 
below. 
Table 2: Means (and standard deviations) of the number of errors of each type produced by two ideational 
apraxic patients on a battery of 10 multiple objects tasks. The figures are based on four attempts by each 
patient at the battery of tasks as reported by Rumiati et al. (2001). DR had a large uni-lateral ischemic 
lesion affecting the left frontal, temporal, and parietal cortices. FG had a uni-lateral cortical-subcortical 
haemorrhage of the left superior parietal lobule. 
Error Type Patient DR Patient FG 
Sequence errors 4.75 (1.26) 10.50 (4.65) 
Misuse1 – 0.72 (1.50) 
Misuse2 5.00 (2.00) 1.25 (1.50) 
Mislocation1 1.75 (0.50) 2.50 (1.73) 
Mislocation2 – 5.75 (0.96) 
Tool omission 0.75 (0.96) 1.50 (0.58) 
Pantomime – 0.75 (0.96) 
Perplexity 0.25 (0.50) 5.75 (1.71) 
Toying – 2.50 (1.00) 
Total errors 12.50 (3.70) 31.25 (11.30) 
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The Representation of the Environment and 
Argument Selection 
Specification of schema triggering functions requires 
specification of some representation of the 
environment. This is also needed to give an account of 
the selection of objects and tools to which schemas are 
applied. It is therefore assumed that a second system 
encodes representations of object present in the 
environment, and that these representations also have 
associated activation levels that reflect each object’s 
salience with respect to a given function or use. Thus, 
in the preparing an espresso coffee pot using coffee 
from a tin and a spoon, the parts of the coffee pot 
(including its filter), the coffee tin and the spoon would 
be represented in the object representation system with 
activation values corresponding to their salience as 
sources, targets, implements, etc. Given this system, 
the act of adding coffee from the tin to the filter using 
the spoon requires simultaneous activation of the 
coffee tin as a source, the coffee pot’s filter as a target, 
and the spoon as an implement. In normal functioning 
this is achieved through excitatory links between the 
schema network and the object representation network, 
with the “spoon coffee into filter” schema exciting the 
appropriate object representations for each functional 
role. At the same time, reverse links between the object 
representation network and the schema network 
implement schema triggering functions and ensure that 
highly active object representations tend to excite 
object-appropriate schemas. This provides a positive 
feedback loop between the schema domain and object 
representation domain and helps to ensure that both 
schemas and appropriate object representations are 
active at the same time.  
A critical feature of the bi-directional excitatory 
links between schemas and object representations is 
that the links are not all-or-none. Rather, an active 
schema provides partial excitation of representations of 
objects that are similar to those used by the schema, 
and vice versa. Similarity is implemented through the 
use of feature-based representations, with similarity 
defined in terms of feature overlap. Thus, if two object 
representations share most of their features then one 
schema may excite both representations, but the 
representation that fits the schema’s triggering function 
best will receive the greatest excitation, and so, all 
other things being equal, should become most active. 
As in the schema network, lateral inhibition operates 
between units to ensure that, for example, no more than 
one object representation can become active for a given 
function at a given time.  
Figure 1 illustrates some of the interactions 
between schemas and object representations when the 
model is applied to the task of juicing an orange (one 
of the multiple object tasks used by Rumiati et al., 
2001). The prepare juice schema includes, as a 
subgoal, cut orange. In addition, prepare juice excites, 
and is excited by, the representations of a knife and an 
orange. When the cut orange subgoal’s preconditions 
are satisfied prepare juice provides excitation to all 
schemas appropriate for cutting. Two such schemas are 
shown: cut by sawing and cut by pushing. These 
schemas compete through mutual inhibition. In 
addition, only cut by sawing receives excitation from 
the representation of the orange (because cut by 
 
Figure 1: Selected interactions between schemas and object representations when cutting an orange within the 
context of juicing an orange. Standard arrowheads indicate excitatory links. Circular arrowheads indicate 
inhibitory links. Functional roles for objects (source, target, implement and theme) are not shown. See text for 
further details. 
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pushing is inappropriate for oranges). Consequently, in 
normal functioning the activation of the representations 
of the orange and the knife will increase, as will the 
activation of cut by sawing. At the same time, the 
activation of cut by pushing will decrease (due to 
inhibition from cut by sawing). Note also that 
excitation of the representation of the orange will cause 
excitation of other orange-related schemas, such as 
bounce (which is excited because the orange is 
spherical, and this feature triggers the bounce schema). 
The bounce schema will also not normally be highly 
active, however, as it competes with the cut schemas 
and received no top-down excitation. Details of the 
schema hierarchy, object representations, and 
schema/object representation associations for the 
orange juicing task are given in Appendix A. 
Justification and Consequences of the Key 
Assumptions 
A key element of the model is the separation of 
schemas from object representations and the 
interactions between the schema and object 
representation networks that this allows. The 
separation is motivated by the idea that schemas are 
abstractions over action sequences. As such they 
represent what is shared by different instances of the 
schema (e.g., common subgoals or features of objects 
to which the schema may have been applied) and 
abstract away what is not shared (e.g., the particular 
objects to which the schema may have been applied). 
Schemas thus have “argument slots” that must be filled 
or bound for any instance of the schema. This situation 
parallels that of linguistic phrase structure, where 
syntactic constraints specify a certain grammatical 
structure, but where the slots in that structure are filled 
in with specific words in order to convey specific 
meanings. 
The problem of binding objects to a schema’s 
argument roles is solved by selecting objects based on 
activation within the object representation networks. 
Other models of sequential action selection, in both the 
psychological literature (that of Botvinick & Plaut, 
2004) and the AI literature (that of Maes, 1989) avoid 
this problem of binding objects to schema instances by 
assuming that action primitives are object specific. 
Thus, Botvinick & Plaut (2004) include “fixate teabag” 
as a basic action, while Maes (1989) includes “pick up 
sander” as a basic action. The difficulty with this 
solution is that it does not generalise beyond the 
precise situation under consideration. Thus, it is 
unclear how Botvinick & Plaut’s model should behave 
when several teabags are present, or when several 
objects that are more or less similar to a teabag are 
present. 
One way of viewing the object representation 
network within the current model is as a simplified 
theory of object-based attention in which attention is 
directed by action. Object-based views of attention are 
supported by studies of feature grouping (Duncan, 
1984; Vecera & Farah, 1994), as well as studies of 
negative priming (Tipper, 1985) and inhibition of 
return (Tipper et al., 1991). The approach adopted here 
is not intended to be a complete theory of object-based 
attention, rather it rests on three assumptions: 
1. that objects can be represented as complete entities 
and that those representations can be excited or 
inhibited by different aspects of a task; 
2. that the activation of an object representation and 
its subsequent selection is mediated by the object’s 
functional role; and  
3. that an object may be represented in terms of its 
major parts, and that these representations may 
play the same role as whole object representations. 
Assumption 1 is consistent with the results of the 
studies cited above, as well as the experimental 
findings of Tucker & Ellis (1998) and the theoretical 
view advocated by Humphreys & Riddoch (2003). 
Assumption 2 receives support from studies of 
negative priming in which the nature of an object 
representation’s priming is dependent upon the object’s 
function in the context of the current goal (e.g., Tipper 
et al., 1994). Assumption 3 is consistent with work on 
part-based selection within the object-based attention 
literature (e.g., Vecera et al., 2001). This work 
demonstrates that the parts of an object can indeed be 
selectively processed by visual attention. The real 
question in the context of the current model, however, 
is what defines an object’s parts. That is, what defines 
the nodes within the object representation network? 
Should both ends of the candle, for example, be 
represented in the network as separate entities? At 
present, this is informed purely by the location errors 
made by patients.  
A further element of the model that requires 
comment concerns the use of schemas to fixate upon 
objects and their parts. As noted above, the lowest 
level of the schema hierarchy includes schemas for 
fixating upon objects according to functional role. 
Thus, in order to pick up a knife (for example) when 
cutting and juicing an orange, the model must first 
select the fixate implement schema (while higher order 
schemas excite the knife as an implement), and then 
the pick-up schema. This use of fixation schemas 
differs from previous work with the model, in which 
schemas of the form pick-up implement were used. The 
use of separate schemas is motivated by Botvinick & 
Plaut’s (2004) presentation of several strands of 
evidence (e.g., Land et al.’s (1999) studies of eye 
movements during everyday tasks) that suggest that 
fixation precedes physical action. The change does not, 
however, amount to a significant change to the model: 
all that is involved is a change to the lowest level of the 
schema hierarchy, with schemas such as pick-up 
implement being decomposed into fixate implement and 
pick-up. Fixated objects may excite schemas (and vice 
versa) if the schema triggering conditions are so 
defined. 
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Error Within the Model 
The model’s behaviour on a specific task is determined 
by the schemas present in the schema network, the 
object representations present in the object 
representation network, and numerous parameters that 
control the flow of activation within and between the 
networks. Previous work has demonstrated that with 
appropriate schemas, object representations and 
parameter settings the model is able to produce well-
formed sequences of action in tasks such as preparing a 
cup of instant coffee and packing a child’s lunchbox, 
but that when the parameters are varied, for example 
by reducing the propagation of top-down excitation in 
the schema network or adding normally distributed 
random noise to activation levels in any of the 
networks, the model produces action errors ranging 
from slips and lapses similar to those of neurologically 
healthy individuals when distracted (Reason, 1979) to 
disorganised behaviour similar to that of patients who 
have suffered a closed head injury or unilateral stroke 
(cf. Cooper et al., 2005). Thus, increased noise in the 
schema network may lead to sequential errors when a 
schema becomes active either before its preconditions 
are met (resulting in an anticipation error) or after it 
has already been successfully completed (resulting in a 
perseverative error). Similarly such noise may lead to a 
schema failing to be activated above threshold when it 
should (resulting in an omission error), being activated 
above threshold when it is not appropriate to the task at 
hand (resulting in an action addition), or being 
deselected in favour of a related but currently 
inappropriate schema (resulting in a blend or capture 
error). 
Noise in the schema network may also result in 
the mis-selection of objects on which to act, due to the 
excitatory links between schemas and object 
representations. These errors may take the form of 
misuse1 or misuse2 errors on the Rumiati et al. 
classification, depending on the relationship between 
the action and objects on which the action is carried out 
(i.e., a misuse1 error if the action is appropriate to a 
different type of object, as in hammering with a saw, 
and a misuse2 error if the action is appropriate to a 
related object, as in attempting the wrong cutting 
action with a knife: cf. Figure 1), or even mislocation1 
or mislocation2 errors if the object relates to the 
location of an action (e.g., the target for pouring from a 
jug or for striking a match).3 In addition, the bi-
directional nature of these links means that improper 
control of activation propagation can also lead to 
objects present in the object representation network 
triggering simple toying behaviours or more complex 
                                                          
 
3 Note that mislocation2 errors require that the object 
representation network includes units corresponding to all 
relevant parts of all objects: thus in the case of striking a 
match against a matchbox it is necessary to represent both 
ends of the match and all surfaces of the matchbox and its 
drawer. 
object-appropriate actions, as in utilisation behaviour, 
particularly when top-down propagation of activation 
within the schema network is attenuated. 
The ideational apraxic patients documented by 
Rumiati et al. (2001) produced three classes of error 
beyond those described above: pantomiming, tool 
omission and perplexity. In fact, the lesioned model 
also produces a number of other types of error – types 
of error that have not been analysed in previous work. 
First, the model may omit to pick up a tool or other 
object prior to attempting to use the object (e.g., 
attempting to pour when not holding anything, or 
attempting to open a bottle without first picking up the 
bottle opener). We now interpret these errors as tool 
omission or pantomime errors, depending on the 
context. Thus, attempting to pour when not holding 
anything qualifies as a pantomime error, while 
attempting to open a bottle without first picking up a 
bottle opener qualifies as a tool omission error. Second, 
within the model the “pour” schema may be selected 
when the same object is active as both a source and a 
target. The resulting action, of pouring an object into 
itself, is not physically possible. Again, such errors 
were not analysed in previous work, but we now 
interpret them as perplexity errors, i.e., errors in which 
the patient pauses and shows signs of confusion.4 The 
model is thus capable of producing the full range of 
error types observed by Rumiati et al. (2001). 
Simulating Performance on Multiple 
Object Tasks 
Methods 
Different tasks provide different opportunities for error 
(Schwartz et al., 1998; Forde & Humphreys, 2002). 
For example, the multiple object tasks of preparing a 
letter for posting and juicing an orange both provide 
opportunities for mislocation1 errors – in the former 
one might apply the stamp to the letter instead of to the 
envelope, while in the latter one might juice the orange 
correctly but then pour the juice onto the table instead 
of into a glass – but of the two tasks only juicing an 
orange provides opportunities for tool omission errors 
and misuse2 errors. A clear picture of a particular 
patient’s apraxic deficit can therefore only be obtained 
by testing the patient on a variety of tasks. Equally, 
when attempting the quantitative simulation of 
                                                          
 
4 An alternative view is that perplexity errors might 
correspond to situations where no schema’s activation 
exceeds the selection threshold, and hence no schema is 
selected. However, such errors only occur when self 
activation is reduced or lateral inhibition is increased, as the 
default parameters for these sources of activation ensure that 
competition always results in a schema being selected. In 
previous work (Cooper & Shallice, 2000) this manipulation 
has been related to decreasing dopamine concentration or 
receptivity within key centres of the model, and related 
behaviourally to poverty of action in Parkinsonism. We thus 
discount it here. 
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ideational apraxic performance it is important to 
simulate performance over a range of tasks rather than 
over just one or two tasks. For this reason, the model 
described above has been applied to five (i.e., half) of 
the multiple object tasks employed by Rumiati et al. 
(2001). The tasks were: 
1. Placing a candle in a candlestick and lighting it 
using a match; 
2. Uncorking a bottle and pouring its contents into a 
glass; 
3. Assembling an espresso pot; 
4. Juicing an orange and pouring the juice into a 
glass; and 
5. Preparing a letter for posting by placing it in an 
envelope and addressing and stamping the 
envelope. 
Schema hierarchies, object representation 
networks and schema triggering functions were 
implemented for each of these tasks. In each case 
objects were represented with a granularity 
commensurate with the errors reported by Rumiati et 
al. Thus, the candle was represented as consisting of 
two ends (one with a wick suitable for lighting and the 
other suitable for inserting in the candlestick), and the 
matchbox drawer was represented as distinct from the 
matchbox (making it possible to differentiate between 
lighting the wick and lighting the base of the candle, or 
striking a match on the box and striking it in the 
drawer). In all cases the schema hierarchy was hand-
coded according to a commonsense decomposition of 
the task into goal-directed schemas and subschemas, 
and schema triggering functions were designed to 
ensure sensible performance of the task when all 
parameters of the model were fixed at values found in 
previous research to yield well-structured behaviour 
(cf. Cooper et al., 2005). 
To illustrate, the schema for lighting a candle 
was decomposed into four subgoals: positioning the 
candle, lighting the match, lighting the candle with the 
lit match, and extinguishing the match. The first of 
these subgoals could be achieved by a schema which 
itself consisted of two subgoals: first that the most 
active theme5 be held and second that the held object 
be inserted into the candlestick. Continuing down the 
hierarchy, holding the most active theme involved first 
fixating on the most active theme and then picking up 
the fixated object. Triggering functions for these 
schemas ensured that the schema for positioning the 
candle activated the base of the candle as a theme and 
the candlestick as the target. 
In most cases the schema hierarchy for each 
task was supplemented with additional “distractor” 
                                                          
 
5 For the purposes of this task the functional role of “theme” 
is employed for the object that should be inserted into the 
candlestick and lit. The theme role is used because the other 
roles discussed above (source, target and implement) seem 
inappropriate. 
schemas. Thus, the schema hierarchy for juicing an 
orange, which is reproduced in Appendix A, included a 
schema for bouncing a ball and several cutting schemas 
(allowing the knife to be used in several ways). 
Without such schemas it would be impossible for the 
model to generate behaviours such as bouncing the 
orange or misusing the knife: both of which were 
observed in the behaviour of DR and FG.  
Output of the model, in the form of a sequence 
of actions, was analysed by a separate program. This 
program maintained a state of the environment 
consisting of the objects present (such as a candle, a 
candlestick, a matchbox and a number of matches) and 
relevant features of those objects (such as their 
location, whether the matchbox was open, whether 
each match had been lit and/or extinguished, and so 
on), and modified the state according to each 
successive action, recording and categorising any 
errors along the way. The output of the scoring 
program was the number of errors of each type 
committed by the model on a given task. For the most 
part categorisation of errors was straightforward (e.g., 
as when scoring a sequence in which the wrong end of 
the candle was inserted in the candlestick), but an 
element of judgement was required in some cases. For 
example an act such as attempting to write an address 
on the envelope without first picking up the pen was 
scored as a pantomime error, while attempting to scoop 
ground coffee from the coffee tin without first picking 
up the spoon was scored as a tool omission error. The 
principle employed in differentiating such errors was 
whether the action could be successfully performed. 
Thus, one cannot successfully use one’s hand to 
inscribe an address on an envelope, but one can use 
one’s hand to scoop coffee. The model is also able to 
generate behavioural sequences that are nonsensical, 
such as attempting to open the matchbox when it is not 
held, or attempting to pour from a container into itself. 
Such behaviours were scored as perplexity errors. 
Simulation 1: Variation of Noise within 
the Object Representation Network 
Rumiati et al. (2001) provided an informal account of 
how the errors produced by patients FG and DR could 
be produced within the model, and in previous work it 
was suggested that ideational apraxia could best be 
understood within the model as a deficit in the 
triggering of schemas by objects (Cooper et al., 2005). 
Modelling this deficit through the amplification of 
noise within the object representation network (the NO 
parameter described in Cooper et al., 2005) yielded a 
plausible fit between performance of the model on the 
semi-complex task of preparing a child’s lunchbox and 
a group of otherwise unselected left-hemisphere stroke 
patients (Cooper et al., 2005). This same parameter 
was therefore manipulated within the model as applied 
to the five multiple object tasks in a first attempt to 
simulate the error profiles of patients DR and FG. 
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Method 
The model was first run 100 times for NO at its default 
value (0.005). As anticipated this yielded no errors, 
demonstrating that the model could successfully 
complete all five multiple object tasks without error. 
This in itself is an important result as it further 
demonstrates the generality of the extended contention 
scheduling theory. 
The model was then run 100 times for each 
value of NO ranging from 0.05 to 0.50 at intervals of 
0.05. Each run of the model included two attempts at 
each of the five multiple object tasks (yielding 10 tasks 
per run, equivalent to the 10 tasks completed by DR 
and FG on each testing session). A measure of the fit 
between the mean error profile of the model at each 
point in the parameter space and the error profiles of 
DR and FG was then calculated. This fit was the root 
mean square difference between the two sets of 
dependent variables (i.e., the error counts for the nine 
different types of error).6 
Results 
Table 3 shows the optimal fits obtained between the 
model and patient data using the above procedure. 
These fits should be interpreted with some caution, as 
the sample size for each patient (four blocks of the ten 
multiple object tasks) is small and there is evidence of 
practice effects in the patient data, with all patients 
producing more errors on their first block than on any 
subsequent block. Nevertheless, and as can be seen 
from the table, the best fit for patient DR’s error profile 
was with NO = 0.15. This yielded a mean of 10.03 
errors over the 10 multiple object tasks. While this 
compares well with the total number of errors produced 
by DR (of 12.50 with a standard deviation of 3.70), the 
                                                          
 
6 Other measures of fit, including correlation and a sum of 
weighted squared differences based on the formula for chi-
square goodness of fit, were considered but found to yield 
similar results. 
detailed fit to DR’s error profile is actually quite poor. 
The model produces only half as many sequence errors 
as DR, and DR was never observed to produce the 
error type, mislocation2, that was most common in the 
model’s behaviour. The fit to patient FG, however, is 
more encouraging. With NO = 0.30 the model produced 
an average of 24.93 errors (within one standard 
deviation of the mean number of errors produced by 
FG), and like FG the model’s modal error type was that 
of sequence. The model also yielded values within one 
standard deviation of FG’s performance on misuse1, 
misuse2, mislocation2 and pantomime errors. The 
differences between the model’s performance and that 
of FG were in mislocation1 errors (which the model 
produced with greater frequency than FG) and in tool 
omission, perplexity and toying errors (which the 
model produced with lesser frequency than FG). 
Discussion 
While the absolute results of this first attempt at fitting 
the model to the error profiles of DR and FG are 
mixed, the general pattern of errors produced by the 
model is encouraging. With high levels of noise the 
model produces each of the types of error produced by 
documented ideational apraxic patients. In particular, 
errors seen in Rumiati et al.’s (2001) ideational apraxic 
patients but not discussed in previous simulation work 
(tool omission, pantomime and perplexity) do occur, as 
do both subtypes of mislocation and misuse error. The 
results also provide weak support for the proposition 
that the difference in impairment between DR and FG 
is not purely one of severity, at least in the sense that if 
FG’s impairment is reducible to high levels of noise 
within the object representation network, DR’s 
impairment is not. 
It should also be noted, however, that the 
precise proportions of the various error types produced 
by the model depend upon both the specification of the 
task within the model and the details of the 
representation of objects. Thus, the model could not 
Table 3: Best fits to the error profiles of patients DR and FG following variation of NO, the parameter 
corresponding to the standard deviation of noise in the object representation networks. 
Error Type Patient DR 
Model: 




NO = 0.30 
Sequence errors 4.75 (1.26) 2.68 10.50 (4.65) 10.16 
Misuse1 – 0.37 0.72 (1.50) 1.30 
Misuse2 5.00 (2.00) – 1.25 (1.50) 0.13 
Mislocation1 1.75 (0.50) 1.66 2.50 (1.73) 5.42 
Mislocation2 – 4.04 5.75 (0.96) 5.29 
Tool omission 0.75 (0.96) 0.03 1.50 (0.58) 0.18 
Pantomime – 0.25 0.75 (0.96) 0.30 
Perplexity 0.25 (0.50) 1.00 5.75 (1.71) 2.03 
Toying – – 2.50 (1.00) 0.12 
Total errors 12.50 (3.70) 10.03 31.25 (11.30) 24.93 
RMS fit to data  2.283  1.881 
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produce the misuse2 error of attempting to cut an 
orange with the wrong type of cutting motion if it were 
not given the knowledge that a knife could be used to 
cut either by sawing or by pushing. Similarly the model 
could not produce the mislocation2 error of striking the 
match inside the matchbox if the representation of 
objects did not distinguish between the matchbox and 
the drawer of the matchbox. The schema sets and 
object representations for each task therefore amount to 
additional degrees of freedom that might be employed 
in attempting to fit the patient error profiles. In the 
absence of any reliable method for determining these 
aspects of simulation, and in an attempt to enforce 
some methodological constraint, they have been fixed 
in such a way as to allow, but not enforce, the specific 
errors reported by Rumiati et al. (2001). However, 
Rumiati et al. (2001) report only example errors, and 
not a complete list of the errors produced by their 
patients, so it is likely that the opportunities for some 
error classes (particularly relating to misuse, which 
depend in the model on extraneous schemas) are under-
represented in the simulation. Even so, the basic 
conclusion, that while FG’s behaviour might be 
modelled by noise within the object representation 
network but that DR’s behaviour cannot, stands. 
Simulation 2: Variation of the Strength 
of Schema/Object Interactions 
Increased noise within the object representation 
networks was originally used by Cooper et al. (2005) 
to model the behaviour of an otherwise unselected 
group of left stroke patients originally reported by 
Buxbaum et al. (1998). The addition of noise is an 
appropriate technique when attempting to model data 
from a group that is unlikely to be homogeneous. 
Indeed, there was considerable variability in the lesion 
sites of the left stroke patients investigated by 
Buxbaum et al. (1998), with some patients having uni-
lateral lesions affecting frontal lobes and others with 
lesions restricted to temporoparietal and/or subcortical 
areas. It is therefore reasonable to suggest that the 
behaviour of specific patients might be better described 
by alterations to other parameters. Several parameters 
would seem to be potential candidates, but evidence is 
emerging that suggests that left parietal structures play 
a role in the triggering of schemas by objects. Arbib 
(1997, cited in Humphreys & Riddoch, 2003), for 
example, argues that parietal cortex is activated in 
situations in which particular motor behaviours are 
legitimate, and, in a PET study of healthy subjects, 
Rumiati et al. (2004) found that left inferior parietal 
cortex was reliably activated when subjects produced a 
wide range of skilled actions triggered by objects. 
This emerging evidence suggests that left 
parietal damage may affect the excitation of schemas 
by objects (or vice versa). Two parameters control this 
excitation: SE, the strength of excitation of schemas 
from object representations, and OE, the strength of 
excitation of object representations from schemas. In 
previous work these parameters, which scale the 
influence of each subsystem on the other, have been set 
at 0.10 and 0.40 respectively. Decreasing the former 
will reduce the effect of object representations on 
schemas and is likely to make the model less sensitive 
to environmental or situational factors, while 
decreasing the latter will reduce the effect of schemas 
on object representations and is likely to make the 
model prone to selecting incorrect objects on which to 
act. However, both parameters affect the feedback loop 
between schemas and object representations, so both 
manipulations are likely to have wider behavioural 
consequences. 
Method 
In order to determine the consequences of these 
manipulations and explore the possibility that the 
deficits of DR and FG might be explained by partial 
ablation of either the object representation to schema 
route or the schema to object representation route, four 
further sets of simulations were performed. In all cases 
the procedure employed in Simulation 1 was followed. 
That is, the model was run for 100 trials at each of a 
number of points in parameter space, with each run 
consisting of two attempts at the five multiple object 
tasks. The root mean square differences between the 
resultant mean error profiles and the error profiles of 
the patients were then calculated for each point in the 
parameter space (as in Simulation 1) in order to 
determine the parameter settings leading to the best fit 
for each patient. 
Simulation 2a involved a more thorough 
exploration of the effects of noise, so as to rule out the 
possibility that noise in different systems could account 
for the differences in the patient error profiles. The 
simulation was run for 100 trials at each point in the 
two dimensional parameter space defined by increasing 
the standard deviation of noise in the object 
representation networks, NO, from 0.05 to 0.50 at 
intervals of 0.05 and increasing the standard deviation 
of noise in the schema network, NS, from 0.05 to 0.50 
at intervals of 0.05. This joint manipulation of 
parameters entailed running the complete simulation at 
10 × 10 = 100 points in parameter space. 
Simulation 2b explored the combined effects of 
decreased schema to object excitation combined with 
increased noise in the object network. The simulation 
was run for 100 trials at each point in the two 
dimensional parameter space defined by decreasing OE 
from its default value of 0.40 to 0.00 at intervals of 
0.05 and increasing NO from 0.025 to 0.250 at intervals 
of 0.025. This joint manipulation of parameters 
entailed running the complete simulation at 9 × 10 = 90 
points in parameter space.  
Simulation 2c kept the parameter controlling 
schema to object excitation at its default value but 
manipulated SE, the parameter controlling the level of 
the inverse route from object representations to 
schemas. SE was reduced from its default value of 0.10 
to 0.00 at intervals of 0.01. For each value of SE, the 
model was run for 10 different values of noise in the 
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schema network, with NS ranging from 0.025 to 0.250 
at intervals of 0.025. Thus, 11 × 10 = 110 complete 
simulations, each involving 100 trials, were performed. 
Finally, Simulation 2d examined the effects of 
simultaneously decreasing the strength of both the 
effect of object representations on schemas and of 
schemas on object representations. OE was reduced 
from 0.40 to 0.00 at intervals of 0.05 while SE was 
reduced from 0.10 to 0.00 at intervals of 0.01. At the 
same time, noise was manipulated in all networks. Five 
levels of N were considered: 0.005 (the default), 0.025, 
0.050, 0.075 and 0.100. This three dimensional 
parameter manipulation involved 9 × 11 × 5 = 495 
complete simulations. 
Results 
Table 4 shows the best fits to DR’s error profile 
obtained from each of the four parameter 
manipulations. Recall that the best fit for Simulation 1 
(when noise in the object representation network was 
increased) to DR’s error profile was in fact quite poor 
with an RMS of 2.283. This fit is improved if noise is 
increased in both the schema and object representation 
networks (with the RMS reducing to 1.454), but 
manipulating noise alone does not capture many key 
aspects of DR’s performance. Comparing the results of 
Simulation 1 and Simulation 2a shows that increasing 
noise within the schema network leads to increased 
rates of misuse2 errors and decreased rates of 
mislocation1 errors (both of which bring the model’s 
error profile more in line with that of DR), but 
substantial differences remain. The model produces 
mislocation2 errors and pantomime errors at modest 
rates, while DR produced no such errors, and the 
number of misuse2 errors produced by the model is low 
in comparison to DR. 
Manipulation of the strength of schema to 
object representation links and object noise (Simulation 
2b) also yields a poor fit to DR’s behaviour. As with 
Simulation 1, this manipulation fails to produce any 
misuse2 errors (which were common in DR’s 
behaviour), and produces many mislocation2 errors 
(which were absent in DR’s behaviour). The fit 
contrasts with that obtained in Simulation 2c by 
manipulation of the strength of object representation to 
schema links and schema noise. This manipulation 
demonstrates that when object representation to 
schema links are completely severed (i.e., SE = 0.00), 
modest levels of noise in the schema network (e.g., NS 
= 0.15) result in an error profile similar to that of DR, 
with the exception that this manipulation leads to 
slightly fewer sequence errors, slightly fewer 
mislocation1 errors, and slightly more mislocation2 
errors. 
An even better fit is obtained when both schema 
to object representation and object representation to 
schema links are modulated, and noise is added to all 
networks (Simulation 2d). However in this case the fit 
was still obtained with SE = 0.00 (i.e., object 
representation to schema links completely severed) and 
OE = 0.40 (i.e., schema to object representation links at 
their default strength). Thus the improvement in fit 
over Simulation 2c (which examination of the error 
profiles suggests is due primarily to increased rates of 
sequence errors in the output of Simulation 2d) arises 
solely from the addition of noise to all networks, and 
not from any additional manipulation of either the SE or 
OE parameters. 
Table 5 shows the best fits to FG’s error profile 
obtained from each of the four parameter 
manipulations. Recall that the fit obtained in 
Simulation 1 (with an RMS of 1.881 at NO = 0.30) was 
better than that obtained for DR, however Simulation 1 
could not account for FG’s relatively high rates of tool 
omission, perplexity and toying errors, or his relatively 
low rate of mislocation1 errors. Some of these 
discrepancies are addressed by the fits obtained in 
Simulation 2. For example, noise in both the schema 
and object representation networks yields levels of tool 
omission and perplexity errors similar to that produced 
Table 4: Best fits to the error profiles of patient DR following variation of several key parameters. 
Model 
Error Type Patient DR NS = 0.15 
NO = 0.10 
OE = 0.15 
NO = 0.050 
SE = 0.00 
NS = 0.150 
SE = 0.00 
 OE = 0.40 
 N = 0.075 
Sequence errors 4.75 (1.26) 2.52 2.19 2.09 4.91 
Misuse1 – 0.29 – 0.34 – 
Misuse2 5.00 (2.00) 2.54 – 4.29 3.63 
Mislocation1 1.75 (0.50) 1.16 1.33 0.23 0.40 
Mislocation2 – 2.12 3.28 0.24 1.16 
Tool omission 0.75 (0.96) 0.88 0.02 0.63 0.48 
Pantomime – 0.91 – 0.15 – 
Perplexity 0.25 (0.50) 1.76 0.34 0.26 0.29 
Toying – 0.07 – 0.01 – 
Total errors 12.50 (3.70) 12.15 7.16 8.23 10.87 
RMS fit to data  1.454 2.187 1.059 0.756 
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by FG, particularly when schema noise is set to 0.15 
and object representation noise is set to 0.25. A similar 
overall fit to FG’s data is also obtained by reducing the 
strength of links from schemas to object 
representations to 0.15 while increasing object 
representation noise to 0.15. However, reducing the 
strength of object representation to schema links and 
increasing schema noise produces a poor fit. (In fact, 
the best fit in this case is obtained when SE = 0.10, its 
default value, so all errors are due to the noise in the 
schema network.)  
As in the case of DR, the best fit to FG’s error 
profile is obtained by simultaneously varying the 
strength of schema to object representation links and 
object representation to schema links, while adding 
noise to all networks. However, in this case the best fit 
occurs when object representation to schema links are 
at their default strength, and schema to object 
representation links are reduced to 0.10 (from a default 
of 0.40). The fit produced in this case (with N = 0.075), 
while not as good as the final fit for DR, captures most 
of the key aspects of FG’s error profile, including the 
relative incidence of sequence errors, the tendency in 
misuse errors to misuse2 over misuse1 errors, the 
tendency in mislocation errors to mislocation2 over 
mislocation1 errors, the absolute rate of tool omission 
errors, and the relative rates of pantomime, perplexity 
and toying errors (though the absolute rates of these 
last three types of error are low). 
Discussion 
The results of Simulation 2 provide some support for 
the extended Norman & Shallice (1986) theory as 
implemented in the model of Cooper & Shallice 
(2000). While it is not surprising that manipulating two 
parameters yields a better fit than manipulating one 
parameter, and that manipulating three parameters 
yields a better fit than manipulating two, the results of 
these simulations demonstrate not only that the model 
is prone to the same kinds of errors as ideational 
apraxic patients on simple multiple object tasks, but 
that the model, when suitably lesioned, can produce 
those errors at rates similar to those of documented 
patients. In particular, the model can account (albeit in 
a post hoc fashion) for the tendencies towards different 
subtypes of misuse and mislocation errors seen in DR 
and FG. 
While a variety of parameter manipulations 
yield reasonable fits between the model and patient 
data, the best is obtained when noise is added to all 
networks. According to this account, both patients have 
a general action selection deficit that may be modelled 
by the addition of noise (with standard deviation of 
0.075) to the schema and object representation 
networks. DR is best accounted for by assuming, in 
addition, the complete severing of object representation 
to schema links (i.e., of the triggering of schemas by 
object representations) with intact schema to object 
representation links, while FG is best accounted for by 
assuming, in addition, a partial severing of schema to 
object representation links (i.e., of the links by which 
schemas excite and ultimately select their arguments) 
with intact object representation to schema links. The 
simulations thus support the view that DR and FG have 
related but distinct deficits. 
General Discussion 
We have demonstrated that the model of routine action 
control developed by Cooper & Shallice (2000) can 
account for normal behaviour on a range of simple 
multiple object tasks, and that when damaged through 
the partial ablation of activation pathways and the 
addition of random noise to activation levels the model 
is also able to provide a quantitative account of the 
error profiles of two ideational apraxic patients. 
Application of the model to the multiple object tasks 
with the standard parameter settings provides support 
for the generality of the model. Simulation of the 
patient error profiles provides support for the 
mechanisms and their interactions implemented in the 
model. It also provides some insight into the possible 
Table 5: Best fits to the error profiles of patient FG following variation of several key parameters. 
 
Model 
Error Type Patient FG NS = 0.15 
NO = 0.25 
OE = 0.15 
NO = 0.150 
SE = 0.10 
NS = 0.200 
SE = 0.10 
 OE = 0.10 
 N = 0.075 
Sequence errors 10.50 (4.65) 8.87 12.30 3.37 9.97 
Misuse1 0.72 (1.50) 1.35 0.18 1.24 0.08 
Misuse2 1.25 (1.50) 3.00 0.51 3.88 1.95 
Mislocation1 2.50 (1.73) 5.91 4.67 0.95 3.75 
Mislocation2 5.75 (0.96) 6.62 5.40 0.80 5.40 
Tool omission 1.50 (0.58) 1.15 0.25 1.16 1.09 
Pantomime 0.75 (0.96) 1.37 0.13 3.47 0.17 
Perplexity 5.75 (1.71) 5.54 2.50 4.80 2.29 
Toying 2.50 (1.00) 0.69 0.46 0.43 0.34 
Total errors 31.25 (11.30) 34.50 26.40 20.10 25.04 
RMS fit to data  1.574 1.687 3.293 1.492 
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cause, at the computational level, of the patients’ 
deficits. 
Basic Assumptions of the Model 
The success of the model also lends support to the 
model’s basic assumptions. Three of those assumptions 
that are particularly relevant to the current work are: 1) 
that the control of everyday object-related activities is 
dependent on the interaction of multiple subsystems, 
specifically related to action schemas and object 
representations; 2) that action schemas are goal 
directed; and 3) that tool use is not a specific isolable 
faculty but is the product of mechanisms that support 
goal-directed object-related activity. We briefly 
consider the role of each of these in turn. 
The triggering of schemas by object 
representations and vice versa is central to the model’s 
functioning and the account both of the error profiles 
of DR and FG and of the differences between those 
error profiles. The triggering of schemas by object 
representations was a central aspect of the original 
Norman & Shallice (1986) theory. It is effectively a 
cognitive equivalent of the Gibsonian notion of 
affordance (Gibson, 1979), and is supported by data 
from slips and lapses in routine action (such as capture 
errors: Reason, 1979, Norman, 1981), empirical studies 
concerning the relationship between perception and 
action (e.g., Rumiati et al., 1998; Tucker & Ellis, 
1998), and neuropsychological case studies of 
utilisation behaviour (e.g., Lhermitte, 1983; Shallice et 
al., 1989; Boccardi et al., 2002) and anarchic hand 
syndrome (e.g., Goldberg et al., 1981; Della Sala et al., 
1991). The reverse links, from schemas to object 
representations, are required in the model to ensure that 
appropriate objects are selected during schema-directed 
action. They complete a positive feedback loop 
between schemas and object representations, which is 
essential to ensuring that appropriate schemas and 
objects are co-activated without the need for a third 
homunculus responsible for simultaneously activating 
appropriate representations in each subsystem. The 
feedback loop also plays an important part in the 
model’s account of capture errors and utilisation 
behaviour, for without positive feedback activation of 
schemas by object representations would not reach 
threshold. 
The goal directed nature of schemas plays a 
critical role in determining the relationships between 
schemas and subschemas. As noted above, schemas 
consist of a set of subgoals, not subschemas. So when a 
schema is activated above threshold it excites all those 
schemas that could achieve any of the original 
schema’s subgoals (provided the preconditions of the 
subgoal are met and the postconditions are not). Many 
other authors have argued for the goal directed nature 
of even everyday or routine activities (e.g., Miller et 
al., 1960; Duncan, 1986; Fuster, 1989; Schwartz et al., 
1991). Equally some have argued that goals are 
epiphenomenal or even illusory, particular with respect 
to the kinds of behaviours considered here (e.g., 
Botvinick & Plaut, 2004). It is therefore relevant to 
note that the current model’s account of certain types 
of misuse error is critically dependent upon the way 
goals mediate schema/subschema relations. For 
example, the model’s account of the error of 
attempting to cut the orange when preparing orange 
juice by pushing down on the knife rather than sawing 
depends on the fact that the goal of cutting with a knife 
(which is appropriate at that point of the task) can be 
achieved in various ways depending on the things 
being cut, including sawing and pushing. Cut by 
sawing and cut by pushing therefore compete. In 
normal functioning excitation from the target of the 
cutting action will differentiate between the two, while 
an error may arise if noise or some other factor 
overrides this excitation. The existence of such misuse 
errors therefore provides support for the model’s 
treatment of goals. (For further arguments concerning 
the critical role of goals, see Cooper & Shallice, in 
preparation.) 
Goals also serve an important role in the 
model’s account of tool use (and tool use errors), 
because tool use is viewed as a goal-directed activity. 
At the same time, tool use is not seen as a special 
faculty or as even requiring any special machinery over 
and above what is required for everyday action 
(although special machinery is likely to be involved in 
the invention of tools and the use of tools for non-
standard purposes). Tool omission errors are 
particularly instructive in this respect, for they imply a 
goal or purpose to an activity beyond simply 
performing a learnt sequence of actions. Thus 
squeezing an orange to prepare orange juice, whether 
performed by twisting a piece of orange on a juicer or 
by omitting the tool and squeezing it by hand, achieves 
a goal of extracting the juice from the orange, just as 
scooping ground coffee from a tin into an espresso 
pot’s filter, whether done using a spoon or by hand, 
achieves a goal of filling the filter with ground coffee. 
It is the common goal or purpose that unifies the 
conventional action sequence and the sequence 
involving a tool omission, and within the model it is 
the common goal or purpose that allows tool omission 
errors to contribute successfully to ongoing behaviour.  
The Relation Between Parameter 
Settings and Types of Error 
The simulation studies demonstrate that the model 
produces certain types of error with certain frequencies 
at different settings of its parameters, but in their raw 
form they provide little explanation as to why 
particular parameter values may lead to particular error 
profiles. This is because interactions within the model 
make it difficult to relate specific parameter 
manipulations to the occurrence of specific errors. 
Nevertheless the simulations show that different 
parameter manipulations do yield different error 
profiles. 
As a step towards understanding the relation 
between parameter settings and types of errors, 
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consider the effects of increased noise within the object 
network (as in Simulation 1). Since the activation of 
object representations by schemas is not all or none, 
normal functioning will result in substantial activation 
of appropriate target objects but moderate activation of 
objects that are perceptually or semantically similar. 
Modest levels of noise in the object network, coupled 
with competition through lateral inhibition that tends to 
amplify any differences, can result in an incorrect but 
similar object becoming highly active and then being 
operated on by the selected schema. (As the incorrect 
object is similar to the correct target object, it will also 
provide some activation to the currently selected 
schema, meaning that selection of an alternative 
schema is unlikely.) Since the representation of objects 
in the current simulations assume that different parts of 
an object are in general more similar to each other than 
different objects, the most likely error with modest 
levels of noise in the object network is that of 
mislocation2 (e.g., striking the match against the 
matchbox drawer instead of against the matchbox, or 
inserting the wrong end of the candle into the 
candlestick). Higher levels of noise in the object 
representation network result in the model confusing 
increasing less similar objects. Hence mislocation1 
errors also occur, but the activation of highly dissimilar 
objects also leads to activation and possible selection 
of schemas unrelated to the task. Hence at higher levels 
of noise sequence errors such as action additions are 
also common. 
Similar analyses may be attempted for other 
parameter manipulations. For example, severing the 
links from object representations to schemas will mean 
that schema activation will be based entirely on top-
down processes (i.e., task expectations). Activity in the 
object representation network (e.g., relating to the type 
of knife or the type of object which is to be cut) will be 
supported by activity in the schema network, but will 
provide no input to the schema network. Hence activity 
in the object representation network will not be able to 
disambiguate between, for example, alternative 
schemas for cutting. All other things being equal, the 
model will then be just as likely to attempt to cut an 
orange by sawing it as by pushing on it.7 Thus, this 
parameter manipulation leads to high rates of misuse2 
errors (as in the case of DR). In contrast, severing the 
links from schemas to object representations will mean 
that schemas will be unable to activate appropriate 
objects. If the links are completely severed, 
mislocation and misuse errors (of both types) should 
                                                          
 
7 In fact, the error of attempting to cut an orange by pushing 
is relatively common in apraxic patients, while the converse 
error of attempting to cut butter by sawing is rare if it occurs 
at all (Goldenberg, 2005, p.c.). This may reflect different 
strengths of “affordance” between the tool and the relevant 
schema. That is, it is consistent with the model that a knife 
might more strongly afford cut by pushing than cut by 
sawing. If this were the case, cut by pushing would dominate 
cut by sawing in the absence of top-down excitation. 
therefore be expected, but it some residual excitation 
from schemas to object representations remain then 
mislocation2 errors are likely to be favoured (as in the 
case of FG). 
Alternative Computational Accounts of 
Action Selection and its Disorders 
A number of alternative accounts of the organisation 
and control of sequential action have been proposed 
(e.g., MacKay, 1985; Grafman, 1989, 1995; 
Humphreys & Forde, 1998; Botvinick & Plaut, 2004). 
Of these, only that of Botvinick & Plaut (2004) has 
been developed into a complete computational 
instantiation. The core of the model is a recurrent 
connectionist network in which action at each point in 
time is a function of the current inputs to the system 
(consisting of a representation of any held or fixated 
objects) and a learned time-varying context coded 
within the model’s layer of hidden units. The model 
has been applied to tasks such as preparing coffee and 
tea – tasks of similar complexity to the multiple object 
tasks considered here – and shown to produce errors 
similar to those of Schwartz et al.’s (1998) frontal 
patients when the hidden unit activations were 
corrupted through the addition of random noise. 
Botvinick & Plaut (2004) do not specifically 
discuss the action errors of ideational apraxic patients 
such as DR and FG. While there is little doubt that the 
Botvinick & Plaut model could be applied to the 
multiple object tasks considered here, it would seem 
that accounting for the specific error profiles of these 
patients would present significant difficulties. Two 
issues appear to be critical. First, there is no place in 
the theory of sequential action control on which the 
Botvinick & Plaut model is based for the concept of a 
goal. It is therefore unclear how tool-use errors 
considered to arise from goal-directed aspects of 
behaviour (such as tool omission errors and misuse2 
errors) might arise in the Botvinick & Plaut model. In 
any case, published simulations suggest that the model 
produces very low rates of what Schwartz et al. (1998) 
refer to as object substitution errors (which generally 
correspond to misuse1 or mislocation1 errors under the 
classification of Rumiati et al. (2001)), so fitting the 
error profiles of DR and FG is likely to prove 
problematic. Second, there is limited scope within the 
system for parameter manipulation. Botvinick & Plaut 
(2004) argue that manipulation of one parameter 
(hidden unit noise) is sufficient to capture the 
behaviour of Schwartz et al.’s (1998) patients, but if 
there can be only one form of damage to the system 
responsible for the control of everyday action, then we 
must conclude that all deficits of everyday action differ 
only in severity. Regardless of the differences between 
DR and FG, both single case studies and group studies 
suggest otherwise. For example, Humphreys & Forde 
(1998) present two patients with action deficits who 
differ in their propensity to different types of 
perseverative error, and group differences on everyday 
action exist between the frontal patients of Schwartz et 
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al. (1998) and the dementia patients of Giovannetti et 
al. (2002). While one may envisage different forms of 
damage to the Botvinick & Plaut model (e.g., partial 
ablation of connections between layers of nodes), no 
studies of such damage have been reported. 
Implications for the Neural Correlates of 
Sequential Action 
Anatomically, it is tempting to think of the feedback 
loop between schemas and object representations as 
being implemented by reciprocal cortico-cortical 
projections between neural regions implementing 
schemas (possibly frontal regions) and regions 
implementing object representations (possibly left 
temporo-parietal regions). However, this view is not 
supported by the model, as reciprocal projections 
typically occupy the same white-matter tracts and 
hence it is highly implausible that a lesion might 
selectively affect projections one way and not the other 
(as hypothesised in this paper). Rather, the model 
suggests that object representation to schema links and 
schema to object representation links are differentially 
localised. One possibility consistent with the reported 
neural damage of patients DR and FG is that object 
representation to schema links are implemented 
through cortical projections between temporo-parietal 
and frontal regions (and hence affected by the temporo-
parietal cortical lesions in DR) while schema to object 
representation links involve more superior parietal or 
sub-cortical structures (and hence are affected by FG’s 
cortico-subcortical lesion involving the superior 
parietal lobule). 
Conclusion 
Patients DR and FG presented with an intriguing action 
deficit characterised as ideational apraxia. Rumiati et 
al.’s (2001) detailed analyses of their error-prone 
behaviour on multiple object tasks suggested subtle 
differences between the two patients, with DR being 
relatively prone to misuse2 errors and FG relatively 
prone to mislocation2 errors. These differences could 
result from differences in severity, as FG produced 
three times as many errors as DR on Rumiati et al.’s 
tasks, but the simulation work reported here suggests 
otherwise. Within the context of the Cooper & Shallice 
(2000) model, DR’s deficit is best accounted for by 
assuming a complete ablation of a pathway from object 
representations to schemas (coupled with noise), while 
FG’s deficit is best accounted for by assuming a near 
complete ablation of the reverse pathway (again with 
noise). It should not be surprising that different model 
lesions were necessary to simulate the error profiles of 
the two patients. The control of routine action is, in our 
view, the product of multiple interacting subsystems, 
and the patients have different lesion sites that may 
well affect these subsystems and their interactions 
differently. 
Rumiati et al. (2001) also demonstrated that FG 
and DR had no deficits in object recognition, matching 
objects to actions and actions to objects, or in 
sequencing photographs corresponding to steps in 
multiple object tasks. (In contrast, a control patient 
WH2, with bilateral frontal damage, performed poorly 
on this last task.) They therefore argued that the 
ideational apraxic deficit of patients FG and DR was 
due to a specific deficit in object-related action 
selection and that the system responsible for this was 
separable from other systems including those involved 
in the storage and retrieval of object-related semantic 
knowledge. The simulation results reported here are 
entirely consistent with this view. 
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Appendix A: Details of the Orange 
Juicing Task 
A1. Schemas and their Subgoals 
Below is the complete set of schemas used by the 
model in the simulations of the orange juicing task. 
The schemas employed for the four other tasks have a 
similar granularity. 
A1.1 High-level Schemas 
High-level schemas are those that do not correspond 
directly to actions. Each high-level schema consists of 
a goal (the goal it achieves) and a set of subgoals (that 
must normally be achieved for completion of the 
schema), and each subgoal has a pre-condition and 
post-condition. When selected, a high-level schema 
will excite nodes corresponding to schemas that 
achieve any of its subgoals, provided that the pre-
conditions of the subgoal are satisfied and the post-
conditions are not satisfied. 
schemaPrepareJuice achieves goalPrepareJuice 
    Subgoal: goalCutOrange; 
Pre: True;  
Post: OrangeCut+HandsEmpty 
    Subgoal: goalJuiceOrange; 
Pre: OrangeCut;  
Post: OrangeJuiced+HandsEmpty 
    Subgoal: goalFillJuiceGlass; 
Pre: OrangeJuiced;  
Post: EmptyJuicerOnTable+GlassFull 
 
schemaCutOrange achieves goalCutOrange 
    Subgoal: goalPickUpImplement; 
Pre: True; 
Post: KnifeHeld 
    Subgoal: goalCutTheme; 
Pre: KnifeHeld; 
Post: OrangeCut 






    Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; 
Pre: True; 
Post: OrangePieceHeld 
    Subgoal: goalSqueezeWithImplement; 
Pre: OrangePieceHeld; 
Post: JuicedOrangePieceHeld 




schemaJuiceOrangeByHand achieves goalJuiceOrange 
    Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; 
Pre: True; 
Post: OrangePieceHeld 
    Subgoal: goalSqueezeOverGlass; 
Pre: OrangePieceHeld; 
Post: JuicedOrangePieceHeld 




schemaFillJuiceGlass achieves goalFillJuiceGlass 
    Subgoal: goalPickUpSource; 
Pre: True; 
Post: JuicerHeld 
    Subgoal: goalPourAllIntoTarget; 
Pre: FullJuicerHeld; 
Post: EmptyJuicerHeld 




schemaBounceBall achieves goalBounceBall 
    Subgoal: goalPickUpTheme; 
Pre: True; 
Post: BallHeld 
    Subgoal: goalBounceOnTarget; 
Pre: BallHeld; 
Post: BallBounced 




schemaDrinkJuice achieves goalDrinkFromGlass 
    Subgoal: goalPickUpSource; 
Pre: True; 
Post: CurrentSourceHeld 
    Subgoal: goalDrink; 
Pre: CurrentSourceHeld; 
Post: JuiceConsumed 




schemaPickUpSource achieves goalPickUpSource 
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    Subgoal: goalFixateSource; 
Pre: True; 
Post: CurrentSourceFixated 






    Subgoal: goalFixateImplement; 
Pre: True; 
Post: CurrentImplementFixated 




SchemaPickUpTheme achieves goalPickUpTheme 
    Subgoal: goalFixateTheme; 
Pre: True; 
Post: CurrentThemeFixated 




schemaPutDownSource achieves goalPutDownSource 










schemaPutDownTheme achieves goalPutDownTheme 




schemaCutTheme achieves goalCutTheme 
    Subgoal: goalFixateTheme; 
Pre: True; 
Post: CurrentThemeFixated 






    Subgoal: goalFixateImplement; 
Pre: True; 
Post: CurrentImplementFixated 






    Subgoal: goalFixateTarget; 
Pre: True; 
Post: CurrentTargetFixated 






    Subgoal: goalFixateTarget; 
Pre: True; 
Post: CurrentTargetFixated 






    Subgoal: goalFixateTarget; 
Pre: True; 
Post: CurrentTargetFixated 




A1.2 Basic-level Schemas 
Basic-level schemas correspond directly to actions. 
Like high-level schemas, they achieve a goal. 
However, they have no subgoals. When selected, basic-
level schemas trigger execution of their corresponding 
actions.  
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A2. Objects and their Features 
Task simulations also included representations of the 
objects in the object representation networks. For the 
orange juicing task, these objects (with features and 
states where appropriate) were: 
knifeHandle: IS_TOOL | IS_EXTENDED | 
IS_HANDLE 
knifeBlade: IS_TOOL | IS_EXTENDED | IS_SHARP | 
IS_METAL 
 AttachedTo: knifeHandle 
orange: IS_SPHERE | IS_MEDIUM_SIZE | 
IS_ORANGE_COLOUR 
juicer: IS_CONTAINER | IS_MEDIUM_SIZE | 
IS_TOOL  
State: Open, Empty 
filter: IS_FLAT | IS_DISK | IS_MEDIUM_SIZE | 
IS_TOOL 
AttachedTo: juicer 
glass: IS_CYLINDRICAL | IS_CONTAINER | 
IS_CYLINDRICAL  
State: Open, Empty 
table:  NULL 
 
A3. Schema Triggering Functions 
The following functions specify the degree, between 
zero and one, of interaction between object 
representations and schemas. The functions are 
employed in the model as follows: 
The net excitation of an object representation 
for a given role by schemas is the sum over all schemas 
of the excitation of that object representation/role by 
each schema. For example, the excitation of the juicer 
as a source is the sum over all S of the 
schemaSTriggersSource(juicer) functions. 
The net excitation of a given schema S by 
objects is the sum over all object representations (O) 
and roles (R) of the schemaSTriggersR(O) functions. 
The right hand side functions are either 
constants (restAct, a constant equal to 0.1 for the 
simulations reported here), equal to the proportion of 
features shared by the given object and the target 
object, or equal to the proportion of features shared by 
the held object and the target object. Where logical 
connectives (AND and OR) are used, they have a fuzzy 
interpretation. Thus A AND B is equal to A × B and A 
OR B is equal to A + B – A × B. 
schemaPrepareJuiceTriggersSource(O) = 
isJuicer(O) AND isFull(O) 
schemaPrepareJuiceTriggersTarget(O) = 




restAct = 0.1 
schemaPrepareJuiceTriggersEffector(E) = 

















isOrangePiece(O) / 2.0 
schemaJuiceOrangeByHandTriggersTarget(O) = 




















schemaCutByPushingTriggersTheme(O) = isSoft(O) 




isJuicer(O) AND isFull(O) 
















































restAct = 0.1 
 
schemaPourAllIntoTargetTriggersTarget(O) = 
isJuiceGlass(O) OR isTable(O) 
schemaPourAllIntoTargetTriggersEffector(E) = 
restAct = 0.1 
 
schemaBounceOnTargetTriggersTarget(O) = 
isTable(O) 
schemaBounceOnTargetTriggersEffector(E) = 
holds(E, isSphere) 
 
schemaSqueezeOverGlassTriggersTarget(O) = 
isJuiceGlass(O) 
schemaSqueezeOverGlassTriggersEffector(E) = 
holds(E, isOrangePiece) 
 
schemaDrinkJuiceTriggersSource(O) = 
isFull(O) 
schemaDrinkJuiceTriggersEffector(E) = 
holds(E, isFull) 
 
 
